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Collective Begging at Its Best:
Labor-Management Relations in South Dakota
Gary Aguiar1
Introduction
South Dakota has a unique set of collective bargaining laws that cause some observers to
ponder whether it should even be considered collective bargaining (Finch, 1979). In essence, we
have the weakest set of tools available to labor. However, in our most recent round of
negotiations, we won some modest victories despite many obstacles. If we can win under these
circumstances, our experiences might help other faculty unions who possess similar or stronger
legal environments.
It is well-recognized that the rights and prerogatives of public employee labor unions have
been under assault in recent years, as witnessed by events in Michigan, Wisconsin and Ohio. In
South Dakota, Council of Higher Education (COHE), the faculty labor union, has suffered from
a weak legal position for more than thirty years; we have few bargaining tools in our belt. The
COHE has primarily played defense, trying to defeat onerous proposals offered by the South
Dakota Board of Regents (BOR). Given our weakened status, our past success in killing
fashionable management fads derived from our persistence and ability to show how these
proposals would play out in the field. In some cases, the BOR imposed provisions that we argued
were unworkable and we were proven right over time.
This paper attempts to answer two questions: What lessons can be learned from South
Dakota faculty’s experience that might help other similarly situated faculty unions? Further,
what does this case study teach us about the disparity of power, especially where one party has
few legal and political tools in comparison to its counterpart? This paper is written by an insider;
I was the labor union president and chief negotiator in the most recent bargaining round with the
attendant biases. The paper proceeds in two parts. The first part discusses the legal and political
environment of public faculty unions in South Dakota. In the second part, I apply DiGiovanni’s
(2011) typology of “intangible influences” on collective bargaining to explain our success. The
Appendix overviews the most recent bargaining round and the victories achieved.
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Context of Faculty Labor Unions in South Dakota
Ostensibly to prevent the rise of aggressive labor unions, South Dakota passed a “right to
work” statute in 1945. The Rushmore State was the fourth state in the nation to mandate “open
shops,” where employees cannot be required to join a union or to pay an agency fee to the union
(Lee 1996). Like much of the country, South Dakota felt the “red scare” of anti-communism.
Primarily stirred up by corporate business interests and a few publicity-seeking politicians, it
foreshadowed the McCarthyism of the 1950s. In 1946, South Dakota voters approved a “right to
work” constitutional amendment (Lee, 1996).
In the 1960s, faculty at many universities throughout the country began organizing labor
unions. These activities reflected a larger interest in labor unions among public employees
generally (DeCew, 2003; Ladd & Lipset, 1973). In response to this trend, the South Dakota
Legislature approved a bill in 1969 that allowed public employers to “meet and confer” with
authorized labor representatives (Finch, 1979). This action could be viewed positively as a first
step to provide public employees with collective bargaining rights.
The following year, the law was strengthened to require public agencies to “negotiate” with
organized labor unions, following the specific meanings as set forth by the National Labor
Relations Board. Further, in 1973, a new law defined “good faith” bargaining that required a
statement of rationale for all bargaining proposals (Finch, 1979; SDCL § 3-18-2). On their face,
these progressive laws would indicate that South Dakota was in step with other states that
provided fairer treatment of public employee labor unions.
More cynically, these efforts could be perceived as an effort to circumscribe the power of
public employee labor unions (Finch, 1979; Smyser, 1972). By providing a severely restricted
space for public employee labor unions to organize and “negotiate” with agency managers, the
situation was more sinister than it appears on its face. South Dakota’s public employee labor
unions possess few tools to encourage or to force agency managers to an agreement. First, South
Dakota law does not allow public employees to strike and it applies a broad definition of strike
with severe penalties possible for violators (Finch, 1979; SDCL §§ 3-18-9 to 3-18-14). Second,
South Dakota statute does not provide for binding arbitration as a means of conflict resolution.
Without the possibility of a strike or binding arbitration, South Dakota’s public employee labor
unions do not possess an anvil on which to hammer managers to agree.
After presentation of bargaining proposals, either side may formally declare an impasse.
Like many states, the other side may request mediation, which may be followed by fact finding,
both administered by the State Department of Labor. In South Dakota, public agencies may
completely ignore any suggestions offered by a mediator and are not obliged to follow a fact
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finder’s opinion. The primary outcome is that either side could use these findings to mobilize
public opinion. Nonetheless, at the completion of the fact finding process, the agency is required
by law to impose its last-best offer, which may be its first-worst offer. Unlike most states, the
public employer is not just permitted to impose its last best offer, but is required to do so. Couple
the unions’ inability to strike and the lack of arbitration with the agency’s authority to impose a
contract, our system of collective bargaining is better described as collective begging.
Since a flurry of legislation four decades ago, South Dakota has made no further moves to
empower public employee labor unions. It has killed several proposals for agency fees, which
would allow a labor union to charge a fee of non-members to service the contract. And similar to
other states, several bills in recent years have attempted to curb union activities, most notably
among municipal employees. In 2010, 79% of South Dakota voters approved a measure that
requires a secret ballot to form a labor union; this measure resembled a bill debated in Congress
at the time.
In South Dakota, municipal employees and teachers unions retain the ability to bargain
salary and benefits. However, state employees do not enjoy the same privileges. The state
legislature determines salary and benefits for all state employees by statute, not by negotiations,
regardless of whether the state employees are represented by labor unions or not.
As state employees, public university faculty members experience the same labor
conditions as other state employees, but with the further insult of being deprived of across-theboard salary increases. South Dakota faculty face the opprobrium of being the only employees in
the entire state of South Dakota, public or private, who are denied—by state law—the possibility
of across-the-board salary increase. When the Legislature grants other state employees an
increase in salary, these salary increases are awarded as a percent of their base salary, but not for
faculty. In an unfair manner, then, faculty are specifically forbidden from enjoying such an
uniform increase. Rather, state law requires that any salary increase must be awarded to
individual faculty based on merit, market, and institutional priorities (SDCL 3-18-3).
Currently, faculty are the only state employees who are organized for collective bargaining.
The 1,200 faculty at all six public universities organize in a single bargaining unit, represented
by COHE, which is affiliated with the South Dakota Education Association/National Education
Association. Notwithstanding dramatic differences among the universities in size, mission,
research scope, history, and workload expectations, all university faculty are placed in a single
bargaining unit.2 COHE negotiates directly with the BOR staff for a statewide master contract
2

Faculty members at the law and medical schools, as well as certain clinical instructors, are excluded from the
higher education bargaining unit. The BOR also administers the state schools for the deaf and the blind. Teachers at
both these schools are represented by COHE but negotiate a separate agreement with the BOR.
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and local campuses negotiate unique workload agreements, analogous to the New Jersey state
colleges’ bargaining arrangement (DiObilda, 2012). Similar to the State Universities of New
York, all public universities in South Dakota—including the flagships—negotiate a single
contract.
Faced with this feeble set of tools, COHE has engaged in a defensive battle for much of its
history, attempting to defeat the most onerous BOR proposals to deny faculty rights. Effective
July 1, 2013, after 30 months of intensive negotiations, our recent contract produced the first
positive victories for faculty at the public universities in more than two decades (BOR/COHE
Agreement, 2013). These victories are detailed in the Appendix. In brief, the first round of these
negotiations resulted in an imposed contract that produced two modest victories for faculty: a
slight increase in pay for overload courses and performance averaging of salary increases. The
second round led to a signed contract that included two larger victories: changes in layoffs
procedures and non-termination protections for Instructor ranks.
Intangible Influences on Collective Bargaining
We now turn to these central questions: Why did this unusual bargaining round in South
Dakota public higher education occur? To what extent did COHE’s actions foster our victories?
What did COHE do right to win this first victory in decades? I employ DiGiovanni’s (2011)
intangible influences on collective bargaining to explore the strategy and tactics that led to these
bargaining successes. His framework, based on his experience with many rounds of collective
bargaining over the years, provides a solid typology to answer these questions.
The Role of History
DiGiovanni indicates that the history is “perhaps the single most distinguishing
characteristic of labor negotiations” for three reasons (2011, p. 2). First, negotiations are part of a
long-term, ongoing relationship that includes previous bargaining rounds, formal grievance
filings, layoffs, and numerous other interactions. Second, particular events tend to loom large in
that relationship (e.g., an administrator’s poor decisions, a brash union officer’s words, or a bitter
strike). Third, history is often inaccurately perceived. Poorly remembered events, often retold by
others, form the basis for judgment.
While individual slights are important, they pale in comparison to the larger historical
factors I identify here. I review some elements of the bargaining history between BOR and
COHE above. Simply put, we have an unequal balance of power. Productive bargaining occurs
when the parties have mutual respect, which requires equity of resources. The inequality inherent
in collective begging I describe above produces a dysfunctional relationship. From COHE’s
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perspective, management has shown only passing interest in our arguments and have persistently
discounted our ability to rile up the general faculty on contentious issues.
However, the broader context of higher education policy played a far larger role in labormanagement relations in this round of negotiations. Public higher education in South Dakota has
seen a dramatic shift to a research focus in the last decade. Gov. Mike Rounds (R, 2003-2010)
broke with past tradition, where the universities were seen almost solely as institutions of
undergraduate education. Now, research endeavors that might produce economic development in
the state and/or additional revenues for the universities are strongly encouraged and supported.
Gov. Rounds directed substantial energies to develop the research infrastructure and capacity of
the universities; his successor continues that initiative. Although his effort began with
commercializable research, the initiative has blossomed to enhance research and creative
endeavors across all disciplines, especially at the three doctoral-granting institutions. Of course,
much of this new energy has occurred with limited new funding. The state and the universities
have successfully leveraged small amounts of internal and external funds as seed money for
larger projects.
Besides this research initiative, the arc of public higher education in South Dakota marks
the increasing centralization of administrative power by the BOR system office over the last two
decades. The implementation of the research initiative has affected all universities, including the
faculty at the three smaller undergraduate institutions who continue to have heavy teaching
loads. As compared to the past, BOR policy now supplants many decisions made by the local
universities. System-wide standardization includes the entire range of university policies
affecting both students and faculty in innumerable and far-reaching areas, including (and to
mention but a few) curriculum articulation across six diverse universities, common general
education and graduation requirements, centrally-mandated purchases of software, and faculty
workload.
From the BOR’s perspective, centralization is a perfectly rational strategy for the political
context in which they find themselves. Faced with an amateur legislature, a very conservative
electorate, and limited state revenues, the BOR perceives itself as one state agency in
competition with other state agencies for very limited new resources. However, this “one size fits
all” approach to higher education policy has been particularly difficult for faculty to embrace as
we recognize the uniqueness of our particular programs and the unintended consequences of
these system-wide decisions. These “shared business services” often require extended crosscampus negotiations and include additional costs (e.g., for software that was designed for one
university, not six). The entire model makes each university less nimble and responsive to
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constituents. Standardization comes with a cost, both financial and educational, nor does it
always lead to efficiency.3
As a result of declining state support similar to that at other public universities, South
Dakota undergraduates pay an increasingly higher proportion of the costs of their education than
in the past. Unfortunately, other nationwide trends have also been embraced locally, especially
onerous market-driven approaches to higher education. These management fads will be familiar
to those in higher education, including “the student as customer,” heavy recruitment of out-ofstate students, an explosion of resort-like amenities, and programmatic decisions that reflect
head-count demand rather than pedagogy.
In short, in South Dakota, the trajectory of historical and political trends played a
substantial role in these negotiations. Two historical facts influenced the outcome of bargaining
more than the on-going relationship between the parties. First, COHE could not point to a single
significant victory in recent decades. Second, the system-wide rapid transformation to a research
focus provided COHE with an opportunity to win.
The Setting of Expectations
DiGiovanni (2011) hypothesizes that initial expectations play a significant role in whether
a final settlement will be considered a good or bad deal. In particular, he warns that
unrealistically high or poorly informed expectations can severely damage the possibility of a
settlement, particularly with new leadership on either side. Perhaps COHE might have proceeded
differently, if we had read and followed DiGiovanni’s (2011) sage advice. However, in our case,
elevated expectations may have led to more productive engagement by union members in
preparation for bargaining than in the past. Further, maybe the lack of victories in the recent past
made our main argument valid: doesn’t COHE deserve to win once, for a change?
As part of my presidential campaign in 2009, I produced a “white paper” outlining a twopronged strategy, which I circulated among COHE activists. In brief, I argued we needed to
recruit junior faculty as members and win “something big” in bargaining. The two goals
supported each other. While not as comprehensive or detailed as the strategic planning process
employed at Rowan University (DiObilda, 2012; Zazzali, 2012), our effort was the first attempt
by COHE in recent years to develop proposals with broad-scale participation by members and
non-members.
3

We have seen some deviations from the centralization approach in the last couple of years, particularly a new
revenue-based budgetary model that returns the bulk of tuition and fees to the university that generated it. Also,
BOR policies now recognize the need for campus differences in mobile computing, admissions standards, and
tuition rates.
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We needed more visibility and an on-going effort to invite faculty to join COHE. We
sought the low-hanging fruit; those already inclined to join, but who had not been asked. We
created a database of faculty emails, because several universities did not allow us to use their
“all-faculty” email distribution list. In this database, each faculty member was categorized by
university and whether they were a COHE member or not, so we could target our messages to
particular audiences. Thus, began a series of letters and communiqués on various issues. COHE
visibility increased and far more information was provided to members and non-members than in
the past, and membership grew as a result.
Through the COHE Board of Directors, we reached out to allies and potential allies.
Following the servant-leader model (Greenleaf, 1977), I used my resources to assist them in
their duties, which included substantial mentoring of new local leaders at three campuses. My
predecessor secured a grant to support the President’s outreach to the campuses. I used those
funds to visit faculty, but especially COHE members, at all six campuses every year during each
of the four years of my presidency. Given the vast distances involved, these annual face-to-face
meetings had probably never been attempted previously. I engaged COHE Board members oneon-one both in person, and via phone and email. This increased communication—which
consumed substantial time—worked because two recalcitrant Board members stepped down and
several others came around to support the overall strategy.
Our bargaining strategy was also rather simple. Our Board decided that we would play
offense for the first time in a long time. Previously, COHE had rarely offered its own proposals
during bargaining. This time, we undertook a year-long process to develop specific, defensible
bargaining proposals. It began with a comprehensive list of everything we wanted changed in the
contract, more than 70 ideas. The COHE membership was actively engaged in the process of
commenting and prioritizing these items. The survey results were analyzed by the Board, who
developed 17 specific proposals. These proposals were vetted at meetings on all six campuses.
That process, and its product, supported our determination to win “something big” for the
faculty. We would not agree to a contract unless we could point to some fruitful provision that
we won. Moreover, we agreed that we were willing to work the bargaining system. We entered
the negotiations in good faith; hoping to earn a positive victory for the faculty. We were prepared
to do the hard work of negotiating: explaining every nuanced point, deconstructing the legal
language, bringing in alternatives, and offering trade deals. We wanted a negotiated agreement,
one that both sides could sign. We did not want an imposed contract.
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The Nature and Character of the People in the Process
“The role of individuals in the bargaining process may be the single most influential factor
that guides the parties” (DiGiovanni, 2011, p. 5). A dozen or more individuals may play a
significant role in the bargaining process, including local union leaders, academic officers, and
general counsels. In South Dakota, the management team comprises some of the BOR central
staff, led by their General Counsel. Very rarely, a campus-based academic administrator or the
university attorney may attend, if a bargaining session is held convenient for them. COHE’s team
included a bargaining representative from each campus, typically the local president, and the
state COHE President served as chief negotiator. I was particularly fortunate to have an active
team that included both experienced and new bargainers. Each negotiator was assigned one or
two areas of responsibility, which worked well during the early sessions.
Nonetheless, DiGiovanni (2011) contends “the chief negotiator plays the largest role in
guiding the outcome of bargaining” (p. 5). He outlines at least five tasks for the chief negotiator,
including (1) serving as the public face of the team, (2) explaining and advancing the client’s
proposals, (3) crafting, assessing, and judging the impact of the proposals, (4) interpreting what
is crucial and what is noise, and (5) setting the overall tone for the discussions.
In South Dakota, the current General Counsel for the BOR has served as management’s
chief negotiator for nearly three decades. This decision irrevocably sets the tone of the
negotiations from the start. An attorney, a professional primarily concerned with legal language
as management’s face implies a confrontational situation. Why not the BOR Executive Director
or the system HR director? Indeed, neither the Executive Director nor any Regent has ever
participated in a single bargaining session. This suggests that the faculty contract is merely a
legal matter, not an opportunity to communicate directly with the most important employees in
the BOR system.
The General Counsel leads the BOR’s bargaining efforts, collaborates with his colleagues
among the BOR staff, communicates with the university Presidents and academic affairs officers,
serves as liaison to the Regents, develops proposals, crafts language, keeps tables notes, and
creates a recitation letter for most negotiation sessions. The current individual has served as chief
negotiator under several Executive Directors of the Board of Regents, under numerous Regents
Presidents, and under several governors. It is safe to say, that he has ownership of the collective
bargaining agreement. Virtually every section contains language he crafted. Indeed, far more
than half of the total text is words he wrote. He is comfortable and authoritative in the process
and has led innumerable contract negotiations.
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Like any rational actor, he attempts to routinize and regularize the process. I suspect he did
not expect anything extraordinary coming into this bargaining round. In past bargaining sessions,
he routinely claimed the head of the table, a simple but effective means of establishing
dominance. A decade ago, in one bargaining session when I was our campus representative, I
arrived early and sat in “his” chair. He was clearly disconcerted, and it led to a particularly
rambunctious meeting. I noticed that when he began bargaining with me as lead negotiator, he
choose to sit across from me, perhaps unconsciously signifying the equality of the parties. In
short, he is influential in the process. As this individual approaches retirement age, we might
contemplate what bargaining would like with a new management lead negotiator. Even if the
succeeding BOR General Counsel were to serve as the BOR’s chief negotiator, it would open the
prospect of a new tone for negotiations and the possibility of substantial changes in the actual
contractual language.
How can I describe myself as chief union negotiator? While it is a difficult proposition, I
think my colleagues would agree with the following characterizations. I am passionate about the
role of faculty in higher education. I firmly believe in shared governance and oppose the
autocratic model we have in South Dakota public higher education. I care about my fellow
faculty and believe they are trying to do a good job in a trying situation. I am impatient for
changes that would improve the status of faculty, because it is the single most important reform
necessary in South Dakota higher education. If faculty experts are consulted, empowered, and
united, we could dramatically improve higher education in South Dakota far more substantially
than any university president, BOR Executive Director, or governor. In bargaining and other
environments, I am very sharp-elbowed, pushing my ideas to the forefront. I am comfortable
interrupting a speaker, if they are going down a road that consumes unnecessary time and is not
relevant to our conversation.
Early on, I clearly indicated to the BOR’s General Counsel that any prior understandings,
ground rules, or other standard procedures with previous COHE Presidents were no longer valid.
I stressed that COHE was under new leadership, which was a fundamental break from the past.
Also, I repeatedly expressed the idea that COHE members were not satisfied with the current
contract and would not agree to an inadequate contract. Indeed, a cadre of members—union
activists—were intensely focused on the bargaining and had heightened expectations. They
proved to be a stalwart foundation at several points.
Again, it is difficult for me to modest here. Based on my colleagues’ assessments after each
session, they report I was articulate, offered good explanations of our proposals, rationally and in
logical terms. I explained how our proposals were good for the university and how their
proposals were unfair or counterproductive to higher education.
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This combination of an experienced management negotiator and a new overly-combative
labor leader could have led to disastrous results. Nonetheless, we developed a professional—if
strained—relationship, with few distractions from the process. Contrary to DiGiovanni’s
prediction, an unruly labor negotiator did not prove poisonous to obtaining a signed contract that
contained victories for labor.
The Aspects of Timing in Negotiations
DiGiovanni (2011) appropriately identifies timing, the right time to act or delay, as an
important influence on negotiation outcomes. He recognizes that external events, which are
largely beyond the negotiators’ control, often have a dramatic effect on bargaining. However,
events internal to the process are also significant. Participants’ decisions on when to deliver a
proposal or hold tight, when to counter-propose can influence outcomes.
In many ways, timing and history may have joined to create a unique opportunity for
COHE to win our recent victory. The BOR engaged in their standard routine, based on years of
unaltered experience. The first—and lengthy—stage involved each side presenting their
proposals and vetting the other side’s proposals. Then began the difficult maneuvering to
discover what each side held dear and what was trade bait. Some proposals were withdrawn,
some reformed. As often happens in negotiations, we ended up with different perceptions. They
thought we had reached an impasse, we thought we could still make a deal. After 18 months,
they formally declared an impasse and imposed a contract.
In the second stage, as I detail in Appendix A, we requested a new round of bargaining.
The BOR staff were taken aback somewhat, expecting to continue with only the few remaining
contentious items. An entirely new round of bargaining likely meant another year or more of
negotiations. They followed another standard ploy: when they could not get us to agree, they
offered the most draconian proposals they could imagine. They had regularly done this in past
rounds, to good effect, for them. Past COHE leaders, fearful that terrible proposals would be
imposed and COHE would be blamed, would back off. Labor would quickly agree to withdraw
all of our proposals and sign a contract with the trade bait removed.
Of course, we expected them to come up with trade bait, but were surprised by the severity
of their two proposals. One was to eliminate tenure. In brief, their proposal was a tenure
retention plan; every seven years, every faculty member would be required to re-apply for tenure.
The other proposal was to reduce the royalties a faculty member could earn on intellectual
property by one-half.
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In our view, neither proposal made sense for higher education in South Dakota. In a state
where faculty salaries are among the lowest in the country, where there are limited urban
amenities, and a near-arctic winter climate, how would we recruit and retain high-quality faculty
by being the only public universities in the nation without tenure? The effect would be
catastrophic, likely leading to very high turnover, especially among the junior faculty. Faculty
impermanence would destroy academic programs and the traditions/cultures of each university.
A cut in royalties on intellectual property would reduce the incentive for faculty to produce
commercializable research, which was contrary to the enormous effort to reify research in the
last decade. We were sure there would be pushback on this proposal by the state’s power elite.
Venture capitalists, economic development leaders, and others would not understand how this
proposal fit with the effort to create a local knowledge industry.
A couple of local labor leaders argued we should follow the well-tread route: trade our
signature for the withdrawal of the two onerous proposals. Our team walked away from the
bargaining table convinced the BOR had just painted themselves into a corner. However, the
majority of faculty activists understood the BOR was bluffing. The sole asset we possessed that
they needed was our signature on a collective bargaining agreement. As it became evident that
we were willing to wait, they were faced with three choices: (1) stick to their guns and impose
another contract that included these impossible-to-defend provisions; (2) lose face and impose a
contract without these provisions; or (3) offer us something substantial to gain our signature.
It is not entirely clear why, but the BOR choose the third option. I have little evidence on
which to evaluate their efficacy, but two possibilities exist.
First, maybe there was some pressure on the BOR to get a signed contract. I suspect
someone behind the scenes thought that an imposed contract meant that the faculty were not on
board with the mission of higher education in South Dakota. Or perhaps, someone thought that it
might hurt the recruitment and retention of faculty superstars or, more likely, third-party
contributions to the universities. After negotiations, I recently contacted nearly a dozen possible
informants to understand these background machinations; none produced any additional insights.
Maybe someone with influence wanted the university system to appear to speak with a unified
voice before the state’s political system.
The second possibility is that our organizing—broadly conceived, including
communicating and framing the issues—might have brought the BOR and their staff to prefer a
signed contract. Three readers of the earlier manuscript, including an anonymous reviewer of this
journal, suggest that our ramped-up communication effort and our drive to change the culture of
labor defeatism influenced the outcome. That is, our public release of their draconian trade bait
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of tenure removal coupled with our refusal to sign a positive-outcome agreement triggered a
change in BOR strategy. Either or both of these possibilities might explain our victory.
Catharsis
DiGiovanni (2011) lists catharsis as the final influence on bargaining; it is “the opportunity
for each side to express what they need to say to each other in the safe environment of formal
negotiations” (p. 8). Especially in South Dakota, for collective bargaining to function properly,
management must truly listen to union concerns. In bargaining, the few angry activists can
express the emotions of hundreds of other employees. Responsible managers acknowledge
labor’s concerns and will offer a counterproposal to address the issues.
For COHE, a sense of defeatism permeated our organization. Too many faculty, both
members and non-members, perceived the labor union as a “toothless tiger” fighting to stay
alive. To change the culture, we needed a positive victory. We are an association of professional
educators who cared about improving higher education, not a bunch of naysayers and
malcontents. If productive bargaining presupposes mutual respect, which requires equitable
resources, we were reframing the conversation.
The BOR staff did listen to us on two issues: inept supervisors and salary compression.
While they did not agree to our initial proposals on these issues, they agreed to continue the
conversation through joint committees on both topics (see Appendix). By removing these
discussions from the formal bargaining environment, the BOR counterproposal for these
committees provided a non-confrontational avenue to understand the dimensions of the problems
and to seek innovative solutions. If necessary, these solutions can be brought into future
contractual negotiations.
A further example of management listening closely to our concerns was the BOR’s
counterproposal to offer additional protections for contingent faculty (see Appendix). They
rejected our initial proposal for continuing contracts “as unworkable at this time.” Nonetheless,
once they understood that we represent and care about the unstable employment circumstances
of our contingent colleagues, they offered a good proposal, which we accepted.
Assessing the Intangible Factors
Of the five factors assessed here, history and timing played the largest role in influencing
the outcome to COHE’s advantage. Even with unrealistic expectations and a combative lead
negotiator, our strategy led to labor’s first victories in years. If my conjectures about the unseen
actors are right, history and timing were critical to our success. The state’s research initiative
brought new players into the higher education labor-management arena. Bringing in new players,
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“expanding the conflict,” is often an effective tactic for the weaker party (Schattscheider, 1960).
In a one-on-one fight, the weaker individual will inevitably lose. However, when more players
arrive, the weight of the new participants may favor the weaker side. In any case, if you are
going to lose mano a mano, better to take a chance to improve the odds with a new arrangement
of the players. In our case, I assume these new players, those outside higher education, wanted a
signed contract. COHE, as the weaker party, now possesses a new advantage, if outsiders who
support research continue to pressure the BOR.
Perhaps the influence of the DiGiovanni’s (2011) five factors varies by case, but in this
case, the historical changes in the public higher education meant that the BOR could no longer
play the same game of dominating labor at every turn. If they hope to recruit and retain active,
nationally-prominent researchers, the universities must inevitably enhance shared governance
and respect faculty voices.
In other states, the faculty voice may be weaker because of nationwide changes. However,
in South Dakota, where we had so little power previously, the nationalizing of our universities
and the concomitant increased research expectations has created an opening for labor to grab a
sliver of power. We possess a simple obstacle to labor peace: our signature on a collective
bargaining agreement. New players—venture capitalists, politicians who favor the knowledge
industry, and the national market for faculty researchers—mean that COHE has gained potential
allies. Like all games, there are temporary winners and losers in politics. Unlike static games,
however, political rules are dynamic and constantly evolving. Obstinate and willful disregard for
changes in power could return labor to irrelevancy.
We must astutely judge the appropriate balance between cooperation and stubbornness.
Staking and holding an early position is an aspect of expectations. Richard Neustadt (1991), in
his famous exposition on presidential leadership, argues that a key factor that enhances a
president’s power is his professional reputation. Neustadt defines professional reputation as a
judgment by Washington elites of a president’s consistency on an issue and his willingness to
act. Presidents who perennially change position—who are too easy to roll—lose power as
compared to presidents who stake a clear position and stick to it. In many cases, obduracy
enhances one’s power, if one has the ability to withhold what the other party needs.
Our steadfastness gave us the determination to fight off the BOR’s horrendous “trade bait”
of removing tenure. We made it clear from the beginning and repeatedly throughout the
negotiations that we would not be able to sell an agreement to our members without a clear
victory, a positive accomplishment, “something big” for the faculty. And we delivered.

Published by The Keep, 2013

13

Journal of Collective Bargaining in the Academy, Vol. 5, Iss. 1 [2013], Art. 4

References
BOR/COHE Agreement. (2013). “Higher education agreement between South Dakota Board of
Regents and the Council of Higher Education, 2013-2016.”
http://www.sdbor.edu/policies_initiatives/univfacubagree.htm
DeCew, J. W. (2003). Unionization in the academy: Visions and realities. Lanham: Rowman &
Littlefield.
DiGiovanni Jr., N. (2011). “This much I know is true: The five intangible influences on
collective bargaining.” Journal of Collective Bargaining in the Academy. Volume 3,
Article 5. http://thekeep.eiu.edu/jcba/
DiObilda, N. (2012). “Negotiations behind negotiations: Reaching out to constituents.” Journal
of Collective Bargaining in the Academy. Volume 0, Article 18. http://thekeep.eiu.edu/jcba/
Finch, D, W. (1979). “The South Dakota public employees’ union act: Is it really collective
bargaining?” South Dakota Law Review. 24: 243-250.
Greenleaf, R, K. (1977). Servant leadership: A journey into the nature of legitimate power and
greatness. New York: Paulist Press.
Interim Terms. (2011). “Board of regents action, December 2011.” (Imposed Contract)
http://www.sdbor.edu/policies_initiatives/univfacubagree.htm
Ladd Jr., E. C. & Seymour, M. L. (1973). Professors, Unions, and American Higher Education.
Berkeley, CA: Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching and the Carnegie
Commission on Higher Education.
Langelett, G. (2013). “Faculty below 65% of Oklahoma survey across six South Dakota public
universities.” Unpublished data tables. Department of Economics, South Dakota State
University, Brookings, SD.
Lee, R. A. (1996). “Reining in the ‘union threat’: Right-to-work laws in South Dakota.” South
Dakota History, 26: 121-136.
Neustadt, R. E. (1991). Presidential power and the modern presidents: The politics of leadership
from Roosevelt to Reagan. New York: Free Press.
Schattscheider, E. E. (1960). The semisovereign people: A realist’s view of democracy in
America. Holt, Rinehart, and Winston.
Smyser, M. R. (1972). “Public employers and public employees unions: Their rights and
limitations in South Dakota.” South Dakota Law Review. 17: 65-97.
South Dakota Codified Law. http://legis.state.sd.us/statutes/
Zazzali, R. (2012). “Negotiations behind negotiations: Reaching out to constituents.” Journal of
Collective Bargaining in the Academy. Volume 0, Article 16. http://thekeep.eiu.edu/jcba/

https://thekeep.eiu.edu/jcba/vol5/iss1/4
DOI: 10.58188/1941-8043.1309

14

Aguiar: Collective Begging in South Dakota

Appendix: Review of Labor Victories in Recent Contract
The recent round of bargaining between the South Dakota Board of Regents (BOR) and
the South Dakota Council of Higher Education (COHE) was the most comprehensive review of
our agreement since our first contract in 1979. Nearly every section was touched or discussed in
some fashion, if not changed. Over 30 months, two dozen negotiating sessions took place in six
towns in virtually every corner of the state. The new contract provided significant gains for
faculty and the university community in two stages.
The first stage was an imposed contract that included modest victories described below.
In this stage, the parties were unable to reach agreement on three proposals, which led to the
BOR’s imposed contract (Interim Terms 2011). The three unresolved items were:
(1) A BOR proposal that intellectual property should not be considered a working condition
of the faculty and, thus, was no longer a bargainable item, except for the division of
royalties.4
(2) A BOR proposal to eliminate tenure for all newly-hired librarian faculty through the
creation for librarian faculty of a new series of ranks similar to the newly-created
Instructor ranks.
(3) A COHE proposal to provide additional protections for faculty terminated through the
reduction in forces provision (i.e., lay-offs).
This imposed contract included a large number of changes, many of which COHE agreed
to. Some changes were good for bargaining unit members and the university at large, including
the creation of Instructor ranks for contingent faculty. Under this system, full-time instructors
(i.e., those with no research or service obligations) are now assigned a rank (Instructor, Lecturer,
and Senior Lecturer) based on education and experience, and earn an associated rank pay
increase. COHE also agreed to other provisions, to which we were initially opposed, as part of a
trade to obtain the pay increase for summer/overload discussed below. This appendix does not
review all changes to our contract, but only those COHE proposed and were successful in
obtaining. We considered these COHE proposals as modest victories in the imposed contract:
(1) An increase in the percent of base salary paid for overload and/or summer courses from
seven percent to eight (for a standard three-credit, undergraduate class). This increase is
actually a return to a previous standard, when the BOR had imposed seven percent.
(2) Averaging of our performance evaluations over a three-year period, instead of solely the
annual evaluation. As discussed in the article, South Dakota public university faculty are
forbidden from earning across-the-board salary increases. Rather, a complex system of
annual evaluations, market comparisons, and administrative unit decisions are employed
to arrive at a salary increase. With zero salary increases from 2009 - 2011 and volatile
salary increases likely in the future, COHE convinced the BOR negotiators that faculty
who performed exceptionally well in years with a small pay increase should not be
penalized.
4

This prime sticking point resulted from the BOR’s insistence that intellectual property was no longer a bargaining
item and COHE’s unwillingness to agree to any contract that removed it. To prevent this disagreement from
hampering a final contract, both parties agreed to disagree. The signed agreement (BOR/COHE Agreement 2013)
recognizes that the imposed terms removed intellectual property from the bargaining environment, but also
recognizes COHE’s ongoing legal actions to challenge that decision as an unfair labor practice (ULP). The ULP is
working its way through the legal system in South Dakota.
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(3) The creation of two “joint system committees.” For the first time, BOR staffers and
academic administrators are meeting with COHE members to discuss these two important
issues. This is a success in that we got the BOR to recognize these two issues as
important and worthy of further discussion. The two committees are
a. Salary compression and inversion. A fifteen-year, system-wide effort successfully
boosted the salaries of junior faculty. However, combined with the complex
salary formula, that effort produced widespread and continuing inequities between
junior and senior faculty. The gap between newly-hired and senior faculty in
nearly all departments has compressed. In some departments, inversion has
occurred; Assistant Professors—freshly-minted PhDs with no experience—are
among the highest paid faculty in their departments, receiving a higher salary than
top-performing Full Professors who have served for three decades! Moreover,
nearly one-quarter of Full Professors are paid 65% or less than their market target
(Langelett, 2013). The BOR has made significant strides to improve faculty
salaries with a stated goal of 90% of market.
b. Inept supervisors. COHE persuaded BOR negotiators that South Dakota’s
autocratic management system sometimes produces ineffective department heads.
In South Dakota, department heads are managers appointed “for good behavior”
and often serve for decades. They completely control faculty careers, including
workload, evaluations, grant support, budget, and other resources. Thus, faculty
are reticent to identify inept supervisors to upper administration. Further, the
grievance process does not reveal the shoddy performance of poor supervisors
because faculty are reluctant to file grievances for fear of retaliation, which in
some cases were overt. Clearly, it does not serve the public interest or the
universities to have incompetent supervisors, especially since the primary means
of discovering them can easily derive from faculty communications to upper
administration.
After 18 months in this first stage, the BOR negotiators thought the bargaining was done.
They declared an impasse; COHE employed the mediation and fact finding steps to no avail. The
BOR imposed a contract effective January 1, 2011. A few months later, COHE approached the
BOR negotiators with an offer to begin a fresh round of bargaining with new proposals. This
request surprised the BOR staff, because they interpreted the law as requiring them only to
negotiate on the outstanding, unresolved items from the previous sessions. Our interpretation,
based on advice from our attorney, was that after an imposed contract, we entered an entirely
new bargaining round. Our request to enter bargaining came with our announcement that we had
the right—and intended to act on it—to bring forward new items to negotiations. Needless to
say, the BOR negotiators were displeased and frustrated.
After this second stage, a final contract was agreed to by both parties—and signed in June
2013—one that included all unresolved items, except the intellectual property dispute which is
being adjudicated by the state courts. In this new master contract (July 1, 2013 – June 30, 2016),
COHE won two provisions that significantly protect faculty and promote the well-being of the
university system by simultaneously enhancing faculty loyalty to their institutions and
recognizing the value of high-performing faculty:
(1) A reform of Reduction in Force (RIF) retention priorities. Under the previous RIF
provision, administrators identified units (e.g., departments or programs) slated for
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layoffs. Faculty within these units were ranked for retention according to their
performance, based solely on their supervisors’ evaluations from the previous three years.
So, layoffs occurred among the lowest-rated faculty first, regardless of rank or seniority.
The new provision recognizes the achievement of excellence by rank promotions. So,
priority for retention under the new RIF procedures employs ranks as the decision rule.
Full Professors are retained first, then Associate Professors, followed by Assistant
Professors and so forth within the instructor ranks. Moreover, within these ranks,
retention is determined by seniority; those with longer service are retained over those
were fewer years of service. Restated, future layoffs occur first among the lowest ranks of
lecturers and continue up through the ranks of the lecturers and then the professoriate.
(2) “Tenure-like” protections for instructor ranks. To support the new instructor ranks, to
which we prior agreed in the imposed terms, COHE won advance notification of nonrenewal of their annual contracts. Previously, a faculty member in the instructor ranks
could be notified of non-renewal the day before their contract began (i.e., five days
before classes began). Now, Senior Lecturers (i.e., those with a terminal degree and eight
years of service) must receive eight months notification that their contract will not be
renewed. Moreover, they are entitled to the same grievance procedures as a tenure-track
faculty member who is terminated, including a committee of peers to review the nonrenewal decision.
While we obviously hope that neither of these provisions will be used, both have occurred in the
recent past. South Dakota State University, the state’s largest university, suffered layoffs in 2010
with great pain. Fifty-five employees were laid off due to a 10% across-the-board cut in state
support for all agencies. These layoffs included eight faculty, two of whom were tenured.
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